An excellent article on TheDeal.com [
http://bit.ly/AN1D5 ] validates my view that leverage is a speculative tool that endangers not only the long-term health of companies, but of the Private Equity industry itself. The article doesn't make these conclusions, but they do follow from the observations the author makes. Let's look at them one at a time.
(1) Deleveraging Changes the Landscape: "The deleveraging of the economy in the wake of the economic crisis has dealt an especially crippling blow to private equity, an industry long as reliant on debt as candy makers are on sugar. For a blissful four-year span that lasted into 2007, leveraged buyout sponsors raked in vast profits fueled by oceans of cheap debt and by soaring asset valuations and a booming economy that were debt-propelled. Today that golden age seems as remote as the lost empire of the Incas."
Indeed, it was private equity firms, far more than the much demonized hedge funds, that were responsible for much of the leverage bubble that tipped off the financial crisis when the game of Hot Potato ended. Private Equity now must forge a new existence (a more responsible existence) in an era where their favorite food has been taken away from them. Imagine Michael Moore without his Ben & Jerry's, that's where Private Equity is without cheap debt.
(2) Bright, but Dim Future: "In one key area, it turns out, private equity is sitting pretty. Before the economy worsened drastically last fall, the industry replenished its coffers, drawing more than $550 Billion in pledges from institutional investors in 2008, a near record...But for now, that alluring prospect is vying for sponsors' attention with a worrisome, brewing development that could lay waste private equity returns and foster an industry shakeout. Though previous downturns have forced slews of poor performers, including some well-known names, from the business, the body count this time could be great. The problem lies in the staggering amounts of equity and debt capital that poured into LBOs from 2004-2007. From 2012 to 2014, about $430 Billion of senior debt tied to that deal spree is set to come due. And unless the leveraged loan market roars back to life by then--something experts consider doubtful [Skinner: I concur]--an avalanche of defaults could wipe out much of the equity the buyout industry wagered on scores of deals."
Casino capitalism strikes again. This is the problem with leveraged deals in the first place. Saddling good companies with a lot of debt for a quick turn sure made the gamblers a lot of profits, but those who were caught at the end of this game of Hot Potato are getting their hands burned, and they are going to have to make a choice between survival (read: burn through all that cash they have sitting around) or doubling down on sure losses by letting it ride. There is a time and place for debt capital: financing the purchase of new equipment, expanding the operations of a company buy acquiring a smaller competitor with an innovative product offering, financing additional inventory to open up a new export market, etc. But the time and place for debt capital is not leveraging the lifeblood of a company on 15 Red.
Before we move on to (3), some math is in order. PE funds have raised $550 Billion in pledges, but there is $430 Billion in Senior debt coming due. So that's a net of only $120 Billion. Not as much capital on the sidelines after all. As I have stated before on this blog and elsewhere, there is another wave of defaults coming anyway, assuredly from the even-more insolvent European banks, and people are naive if they think it won't further ripple across the Atlantic.
(3) Big Deals Go Bust: "'There will be a lot of RJRs,' one buyout specialist predicts, alluding to KKR's $31.3 Billion buyout of RJR Nabisco in 1989, which held the size record for an LBO for 16 years and which lost money for KKR. 'Not bad companies, necessarily, but companies with capital structures the sponsors can't extricate themselves from and that can't be refinance.' This investor says he expects one-quarter of the megadeals to be total busts, another quarter to make a profit and half to post a partial loss. 'But that's only if the economy recovers,' he adds. 'If it doesn't, those deals are all toast.'"
Notice that the problem isn't that they invested in bad companies; it's that they invested in bad deals. There is a difference. There is also such a thing as a good deal in a bad company. I threw together a quick color-coded visual to help us understand the differences.
Private Equity's future no doubt must focus on Value Plays and Turnarounds rathe than chasing the biggest, sexiest headline-making deals.
(4) The Interest Rate Storm Cloud: "One top LBO banker calls even that scenario too bullish. 'If we do have capital markets in, say, 2012, sponsors could have to refinance at grotesquely high interest rates, and that will permanently impair their equity,' he says. 'That's the good case.' If, on the other hand, credit is scarce, sponsors may have to sell stock in their albatross deals to pay off debt, massively diluting their own stakes. Weak performers may end up being sold at a loss to deep-pocketed corporations or broken up and sold in pieces. Creditors would recover of what they lent, and sponsors would get zilch."
Debt-heavy Private Equity can't operate in vacuum. It is going to be subject to the topsy-turvy nature of an unstable bond market over the next several years. For firms operating primarily in the U.S. market, this means interest rates that are only going to increase in the next few years (whether to tame inflation, or as the markets revolt against it), with the less probable, though still possible apocalyptic prospect of being forced to take out future debts in Yuan or IMF SDR-denominated bonds in order to refinance their investments.
This data all points toward a leverage-free approach as the optimal way not only to preserve wealth for investors, but to create more of it--just on a less aggressive timeline than the speculators can traditionally "promise" (the problem with debt-driven speculation is that it always collapses. It is a universal truth that is ignored when everybody gets bubble fever. Investing with managers who maintain active awareness of these dangers will help investors protect their capital in the future).
(5) Debt + Excessive Valuation = Low or Negative Returns: "Nevertheless, the returns that LBOs done at the market's peak ultimately deliver, many say, are apt to be skimpy at best, and not solely because of the colossal debt. Another drag on returns will be the bloated LBO valuations of that era. With money now tight, sponsors have little chance of selling their holdings for close to the valuations they paid. 'My prediction is that many private equity funds of that vintage won't return capital, won't break even. Those that do will be top-quartile [performers],' says an executive at a mayor buyout house. 'The industry will be challenged and tested in a way it never has before.'"
Or, as Warren Buffett once said "When you combine ignorance and leverage, you get some pretty interesting results."
(6) Will Private Equity Learn? "'What's more, there will likely be a drastic overhaul of how private equity operates, some sponsors say. Many expect the hefty transaction fees firms have collected, which in some megadeals topped $200 million, to be reined in. Megadeals themselves will be a casualty, and buyout funds will be scaled back to reflect the downshift in debt financing. 'A lot of people now are talking about a new alignment of financial incentives for private equity and hedge funds,' a buyout sponsor observes. 'The incentives to do deals were skewed by the fees that sponsors and bankers were pocketing.' Likening the deal binge to a hamster running furiously on a wheel, he says: 'People will look back and ask, Why did the hamster run like that? It was because of the food it saw in front of it. 'That kind of incentive makes sense for a hamster, but it led to the insanity' that gripped the buyout market, he says."
"He and others argue that when LBO activity revives, banks and sponsors alike, chastened by the pain they caused themselves in the mid-2000s, will keep a lid on leverage and structure deals prudently. 'It will be like what happened to venture capital' after the bursting of the tech and telecom bubble in 2001, he argues. 'People didn't dispose of the VC model,' but overhauled it. Others aren't so sanguine about private equity's ability to learn. 'At some point the competition for deals will heat back up,' says UBS's Smith, 'People's memories fade. I'm highly confident that we will overcook the market again. It happens every 20 or 30 years."
Conclusion
Private Equity needs to be overhauled. The inertia in the industry, however, will make it slow-going. The guys with 20 years of experience in private equity will continue to long for the "good 'ol days," and will have the play book to prove it. Like the music industry with the advent of online music downloads, like the telegraph industry when the telephone came along, like the American automotive industry in the face of Asian competition, most private equity managers will keep up their old ways in an era where they are archaic, outmoded, and useless.
Out-sized returns are possible in a world without massive leverage and disproportionate debt levels, but they simply require more hard work. It takes the full-court press.
[To read about how David defeats Goliath with the Full Court Press, read this great article in the New Yorker by Malcolm Gladwell, Author of
The Tipping Point http://bit.ly/m9zFn ]
The future of Private Equity will be mixed. For those who respond to the changing times, who are willing to invest more in adding value than flipping for a quick profit, for those who are willing to invest in companies that they would be happy owning even if the stock markets were shut down for 10 years (to borrow again from Buffett), and that big IPO simply were never possible, for those managers, the future is bright. But those who cling to the past will be eaten up by the mountains of debt that they once thought were their road to riches.
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